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Case No. 900504-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of property 
obtained by unlawful conduct, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.4 (1990). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Was sufficient evidence presented at trial to 
sustain defendant's conviction for property obtained by unlawful 
conduct? This Court will not reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence unless the evidence and the reasonable 
inferences therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, are sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted. 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989). Accord State 
v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error in its 
in truction to the jury on the elements of the offense charged? 
This is a matter of discretion, reviewable only for prejudical 
error. State v. Lopezf 789 P.2d 39, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986); State v. Knight, 
734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Martin Hernandez, was charged with one count 
of property obtained by unlawful conduct, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.4 (1990) (Record 
[hereinafter R.] at 13)• On September 13, 1990, a jury trial 
commenced in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron County, 
Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, presiding (R. 51). The same 
day, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged (R. 86). 
Defendant waived time for sentencing, requesting immediate 
imposition of sentence (Transcript of Trial, September 13, 1990 
[hereinafter T.] at 176-77). Defendant was sentenced to the 
statutory indeterminate term of zero to five years, to run 
consecutively with any other sentences defendant was then serving 
(R. 87, 104-05; T. 178). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant, Martin Hernandez, a convicted felon, has 
been housed in the Iron County-Utah State Correctional Facility 
in Cedar City, Utah, from approximately July 1989 to the present 
(T. 39-50, 98-103, 126). While in the Iron County facility, 
defendant, and several other inmates, became involved in a series 
of fraudulent credit card transactions (T. 116-118). Inmates 
perpetrating the credit card scam phone ordered merchandise using 
valid, unissued American Express Credit Card numbers (T. 58-61, 
75, 116). 
In approximately July-August 1989, defendant approached 
John Maycockf an inmate directly involved in obtaining the 
unissued credit card numbers, and requested that Maycock order 
some merchandise for him (T. 92, 101, 117-18, 126). Defendant 
threatened Maycock with "some type of violence" if :he refused to 
place his order (T. 117). Subsequently, in approximately August 
1989, Aleta Bowman, a property officer at the Iron County 
facility, received merchandise from ZCMI and Collett's addressed 
to several inmates, including defendant (T. 42). Upon its 
arrival at the facility, the merchandise was seized and kept in 
the evidence room pursuant to an investigation of the credit card 
scam (T. 42)• 
On November 8, 1989, Officer Bowman called together the 
inmates to whom the seized merchandise was addressed, including 
defendant, and informed them that the property was under 
investigation for credit card fraud (T. 43-44). She further 
informed the inmates that they could either sign for and receive 
the property, or not sign for it, in which case they would not 
receive the property (T. 43-45). Defendant was among those 
As a property officer, it was Bowman's responsibility to 
search, receipt and deliver incoming property to the inmates (T. 
39). 
choosing to sign a property receipt for the merchandise addressed 
to him which stated "Inmate assumes sole responsibility for 
property listed" (T. 44; R. 82, a copy of property receipt signed 
2 by defendant is attached hereto as Addendum A). Because the 
merchandise had been seized for investigation/ defendant was not 
allowed to take physical possesion of the property for which he 
3 
had signed (T. 42). 
Shortly after the present charge was filed against him, 
defendant approached Edward Monteiro in approximately May 1990, 
and asked him to testify falsely that Maycock had told him that 
he (Maycock) had ordered the merchandise without defendant's 
knowledge (T. 89-90, 102-03). In exchange for Monteiro's 
favorable testimony, defendant promised that he would clear 
Monteiro's "rat jacket" (T. 90-102). Monteiro refused to comply 
with defendant's request (T. 90-102). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented at trial, together with all 
reaonable inferences, is sufficient to sustain defendant's 
conviction for property obtained by unlawful conduct. Further, 
the trial court properly instructed the jury as to the requisite 
2 
Property listed on the receipt signed by defendant included: 
one pair of Nike Air athletic shoes, one Sharp stereo, and one 
Sony Walkman with headphones (R. 82; see Addendum A). 
3 
The Sharp stereo defendant signed for would not have been 
delivered to him even if it had not been seized pursuant to the 
investigation because compact disc stereos are not allowed in the 
facility (T. 51-52). Inmates who receive property that cannot be 
used in the facility are allowed to issue a release form to have 
the property transferred to family members (T. 52). Defendant 
told another inmate, Edward Monteiro, that he didn't care whether 
the stereo he had ordered was approved or not because he could 
send it home (T. 7). 
elements of the offense which properly included a constructive 
theory of receipt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TOGETHER WITH 
ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION AND THE TRIAL 
COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY CONCERNING 
THE ELEMENT OF RECEIPT, 
Defendant asserts that evidence adduced at trial is 
insufficient to establish that he unlawfully "received, retained, 
concealed, possessed, or disposed" of property within the meaning 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.4 (1990)5 (Brief of Appellant 
[hereinafter Br. of App.] at 3). 
A. The Evidence Adduced at Trial is Sufficient to 
Establish Defendant's Constructive Receipt of 
Unlawfully Obtained Property. 
In reviewing an allegation of insufficient evidence, 
this Court views the evidence and the reasonable inferences 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict and will not 
reverse a jury conviction unless the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
4 
The State's response to the issues defendant raises on appeal 
is condensed in a single point due to the similarity between 
defendant's argument in support of his challenge to both the 
sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions. 
5 
The statute in full provides: 
It is unlawful for any person to receive, 
conceal, possess, or dispose of personal 
property, cash or other form representing 
value, if he knows or has reason to believe 
the property, cash, or other form 
representing value has been obtained through 
unlawful conduct described in Section 76-6-
506.1, 76-6-506.2, or 76-6-506.3. 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted. State v. Johnsonf 774 P.2d 
1141, 1147 (Utah 1989). Accord State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 
137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Turning to the facts established at trial and their 
reasonable inferences, defendant does not dispute that he signed 
a property receipt for merchandise addressed to him which clearly 
stated: "Inmate assumes sole responsibility for property listed" 
(Br. of Appp. at 4; T. 44; R. 82, see Addendum A). Rather, 
defendant appears to assert that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.4 
requires actual physical possession of property and that his act 
of signing the property receipt was simply insufficient to 
establish that he received or possessed the merchandise within 
the meaning of the statute (Br. of App. at 3-4). Because 
defendant has not supported his assertion with any legal analysis 
or supporting authority, this Court may properly decline to rule 
on it. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
Should this Court determine that defendant's bare 
assertion provides sufficient grounds for this Court to consider 
the merits of his claim, the evidence established at trial is 
sufficient to demonstrate that defendant constructively received 
the merchandise addressed to him. 
Although Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506 (1990) defines terms 
for purposes of financial transaction card offenses, the terms 
"receive, retain, conceal, possess, or dispose" are not included 
in that section. In addition, the term "receive" has not 
previously been interpreted by either this Court or the Utah 
Supreme Court in the specific context of credit card fraud. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that it is no defense 
to the offense of obtaining property by unauthorized use of a 
credit card to show that the property was ultimately picked up by 
a third party. Combs v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P.2d 437 
(1971) (defendant asserted he had changed his mind about picking 
up tires purchased with a proscribed credit card "because he had 
been out of prison for four years and wanted to stay out;" 
however, he then permitted his wife and another to go pick up the 
tires). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.1 (1990). 
In the absence of a statutory definition of the term 
"receive" in the specific context of financial transaction card 
offenses, it is both appropriate and necessary to refer to the 
term as it is defined generally in the Criminal Code. State v. 
One Porsche 2-Door, Etc., 526 P.2d 917, 919 (Utah 1974) (noting 
that one of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is 
that courts will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the 
legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject 
matter of the statute dealing with the subject) (citations 
omitted); Anthony Investment Co. v. Arizona Department of 
Economic Security, 132 Ariz. 176, 644 P.2d 912, 915 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1982) (noting that it is a well established rule of 
statutory construction that statutes are to be construed together 
and that legislative construction of the meaning of certain words 
in one act is entitled to consideration in construing the same 
words appearing in another act). Contrary to defendant's 
assertion, statutes proscribing offenses against property 
encompass a constructive theory of receipt and/or possession. 
Specifically, in the theft by receiving statute, "receives" is 
defined as "acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on 
the security of the property.M Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(3)(a) 
(1990). For purposes of the theft statutes, evidence that the 
accused had control over the property, not necessarily physical 
possession, is generally sufficient to establish the requisite 
receipt or possession element of the offense charged. Actual 
physical possession is not required. State v. Dyett, 114 Utah 
379, 199 P.2d 155, 157 (Utah 1948). Accord, State v. Bailey, 94 
Or. App. 767, 767 P.2d 114, 115 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (the state 
need not prove physical possession in order for a jury to find 
that a defendant maintained sufficient control over stolen 
property to constitute concealment); State v. Ashby, 77 Wash.2d 
33, 459 P.2d 403, 405 (Wash. 1969) ("prevailing rule at common 
law and in most jurisdictions is that actual physical possession 
is not a requisite of receiving. . . . [i]ntentional control over 
the goods by the receiver is sufficient"). See also LaFave & 
Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 8.10 at 423-25 (1986) (one may 
receive property when one exercises control over it). 
In addition to the above statutory definition of 
"receives" (which encompasses a contructive theory), the Utah 
Supreme Court has applied a constructive theory of possession to 
other criminal offenses. Specifically, the court has not 
required actual physical possession in its interpretion of the 
Controlled Substances Act holding that "[a]ctual physical 
possession is not a required element of the crime of possession 
controlled substance. A finding of constructive possession 
uae defendant will satisfy the possession element, State v. 
H a n s e n , 7 1. ? Il .'ill 1  ' ' I 'I1 1J" " •'• M)l » | . M ; d 1 j s n S t a t e v . 
Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1223- 1988) (actual physical 
possess:! on i s i lot a necessary element of the offense of 
production of a controlled substance) Rather than requi j ' 
actual physical possession, the court has emphasised the element 
• 
To prove that a defendant was in knowing and 
intentional possession of a controlled 
substance, the prosecution need only 
establish that the produced contraband was 
found in a place or under circumstances 
indicating that the accused had the ability 
and the intent to exercise dominion and 
control over it, 
Hansen, 732 P.2d at J 32 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). • 
Accord State v. Bingham, 732 P.2d (Utah 1987), 
Just a s tl i€ ' I Ital I Sup re • I e :i a 
constructive theory of possession ;n ne context of the 
Controlled Substances *-<•* ~* - • * «-- * --K - statutes, this Court 
should appl"^ rj • *. . r possessic i i 
":. the specific context of financial transaction card offenses• 
x is appropriate for this Cour" * refer the above authority 
T determining the scope < ^ 
similar financial transaction card offenses, sub-category of 
property offenses. Application JL the above analysis t;n the 
present case shows that the evidence of defendant JIISI i ucl i"" e 
receipt of the merchandise is sufficient because It establishes 
See Combs, 483 P.2d at 439; Dyett, 199 P.2d at 1 57. 
ts 
that defendant exerted "dominion and control" over the property. 
Defendant clearly claimed ownership of the merchandise and 
accepted responsbility for it when he signed the property 
receipt. Jones v. State, 276 Ark. 116, 632 S.W.2d 414 (Ark. 
1982) (where property was located in defendant's vehicle, his 
claim of ownership provided the necessary element to prove 
constructive possession). Defendant's signature on the receipt 
vested him with full responsibility for the property, which was 
not available to other inmates, nor could it be disposed of by 
facility personnel without defendant's consent (T. 51-52). Based 
on the foregoing, evidence of defendant's constructive receipt of 
the merchandise adduced at trial is sufficient to affirm his 
conviction for property obtained by unlawful conduct. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury 
Concerning the Receipt Element of the Offense. 
Concomitant with his challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence, defendant asserts that the trial court committed 
reversible error in its instruction No. 10 to the jury on the 
receipt element of the offense of property obtained by unlawful 
7 
conduct. Defendant takes issue with language in the instruction 
which states in part: "You are instructed that one may receive, 
retain, conceal, possess or dispose of personal property without 
having actual physical possession thereof." In making his 
argument, defendant states that the above language is unsupported 
The jury was fully advised as to each requisite element of the 
offense (R. 74, 75, Jury Instructions No. 9 and 10; copies of 
instructions no. 9 and 10 are attached hereto as addendum B). 
by either Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.4 or 'U'tah case law (Br. of 
App. P* * ) . 
il, I i h the exclusive province of the trial court 
M 1 I ! Ill V • -l lit 1 f! A'1' " " " ' :' / 
over the objection - lefendant's counsel, any instruct 
that • proper form, states the law ccrreetly, and doet n- ' 
State v. Hansei, ''* 
(Utah 1986) (citation ommitted). Here, the trial court ful- v -. nd 
correctly instructed the jury the- elements of offense 
State's analysis properly included a theory 
construct receipt and/or possession wh.i •-• consistent 
- dl.u tc :i : J defi i :i :i I:i c i i :: f 1:1 ic= > t = ; 
relates to theft arid interpretative opinions from the Utah 
Supreme court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction 
at, RESPECTFULLY submitted this £r>' day of February, 1991 
PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
I RON COUNTY / UTAH STATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY N2 0 4 3 2 
PROPERTY RECEIVED THROUGH 0 " MAII I | IC/USCF D VISITING 
Inmate assumes sole responsibility for property listed. 
R /Kkr/r yi t/Krj/rfoz NO .__ DATE.- )h jv Of 
(Inmate's Name) ' 
OM. The following articles: 
(Visitor's Name) / / / 
IcJmate': s S.qnaturr ^ ^ ^ Q 
ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you may find Defendant Martin Hernandez guilty of 
the offense of Property Obtained by Unlawful Conduct as charged in 
the Information, the State must prove and you must find, 
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each of every one of 
the following elements: 
1. That Defendant Martin Hernandez received, retained, 
concealed, possessed, or disposed of personal 
property; 
2. That Defendant Martin Hernandez knew or had reason to 
believe the property had been obtained by the unlawful 
conduct of purchasing or attempting to purchase goods 
or property by the use of a false, fictitious, or 
fraudulently obtained card number; 
3. That said property had a retail value of $250 or 
more; and 
4. That such events occurred on or about November 8, 
1989, in Iron County, State of Utah. 
If the State has proved each and every one of the foregoing 
elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt; then 
it is your duty to find the Defendant guilty of Property Obtained 
by Unlawful Conduct as charged in the Information. However, if 
the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the 
previously described elements, you must find the Defendant not 
guilty of the offense of Property Obtained by Unlawful Conduct 
as charged in the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO, \t> 
You are instructed that one may receive, retain, 
conceal, possess or dispose of personal property without having 
actual physical possession thereof. If you find from the evidence 
and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally 
exercised dominion or control over the property, or acquired 
ownership or title thereto, or placed the property in the possession 
of another to be held for defendant's benefit, then you may find 
that the defendant received, retained, concealed, possessed or 
disposed of personal property even though he never actually touched 
that property. 
